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Abstract
The study reported in this paper examined a group of Australian taxpayers who have
expressed a preference for an aggressive tax agent. The study attempted to understand
how high-risk taxpayers and high-risk practitioners form their partnerships by examining
aggressive taxpayers attitudes and perceptions of the Australian tax system. Data were
taken from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey, which tested a random
sample of 2040 Australian taxpayers. Results from a series of independent sample t-tests
revealed that there are a number of important differences between aggressive and non-
aggressive taxpayers. Finally, a stepwise discriminant function analysis was used to
determine which variables can most effectively differentiate aggressive taxpayers from
other taxpayers. The best predictive model obtained from this analysis indicated that
taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning tend to have higher family incomes and are
more status-oriented than other taxpayers. They are also more likely to blame the
Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) if caught for a tax offence, are more likely to be
vindictive towards the Tax Office as a result, and are more likely to adopt a resistance
posture towards the Tax Office. Not surprisingly, taxpayers with an aggressive tax agent
are more likely to be game-players than other taxpayers. These findings are discussed in
the regulatory context. Possible solutions for how tax authorities might deal with this
high-risk group of taxpayers are suggested.
1Aggressive tax planning: Differentiating those playing the game from those who don’t
Kristina Murphy and Yuka Sakurai
Introduction
There are many reasons why taxpayers choose to use a tax agent. These reasons range from
taxpayers wanting to file an accurate return, not having the knowledge to complete a complex
return, wanting to minimise the tax they are required to pay, or simply not having enough time
to complete their own return. Whatever the reason, taxpayer demand for tax agents has
increased substantially over the past few decades, with approximately 70% of Australian
taxpayers now choosing to use a tax practitioner (Braithwaite, 2000; Commissioner of
Taxation, 1997).
The role that tax agents play in taxpayer compliance has received increasing attention over
the past 15 years. Research in the United States has shown that professionally prepared
returns tend to be more non-compliant than self-prepared returns and tax practitioners have
stated that their clients demand such work (for example, Coyne, 1987; Erard, 1993;
Helleloid, 1989; Klepper & Nagin, 1989a). In contrast, a number of studies have reported that
taxpayers demand cautious behaviour and accurate returns from their tax agents (Hite &
McGill, 1992; Sakurai & Braithwaite, 2001; Tan, 1999). This debate is far from being
resolved. The aim of the study reported in this paper was to identify the factors that lead
taxpayers to seek the services of an aggressive tax practitioner. It did this by examining a
sub-sample of Australian taxpayers, namely, those believed to have an aggressive tax agent.
Theories of non-compliance
A number of theories have been proposed to explain non-compliant behaviour, both in the
taxation context and in regulatory fields in general. The most dominant model of non-
compliance in the regulatory field portrays the subject as an amoral profit-seeker whose
actions are motivated wholly by rational calculation of costs and opportunities (Kagan &
Scholz, 1984, p. 69). In the taxation literature this assumption underlies the deterrence theory
approach (Grasmick & Green, 1980). The central explanatory proposition is that a taxpayer is
likely to break the law unless anticipated legal penalties exceed the additional earnings that
could be made by evading tax.
2One of the main limitations of the deterrence theory approach, however, is that it does not
satisfactorily explain the high levels of observed compliance. Smith and Kinsey (1987) have
shown that the majority of American taxpayers are compliant even when the possibility of
detection and punishment for non-compliance is obviously slim. Australian research has also
shown that taxpayers report being generally compliant even when they believe others are not
(Braithwaite, 2000). These findings suggest that taxpayers attitudes towards the tax system,
rather than (or in addition to) purely economic calculations or fear of punishment, are
important in explaining taxpayers non-compliance. Wallschutzky (1984) also indicates that
attitudes are more important than opportunities in determining taxpayers behaviour. The
incorporation of attitudes to the regulatory system into theoretical accounts of non-
compliance is the basic contention of Kagan and Scholzs (1984) political citizen model.1
Kagan and Scholzs political citizen model incorporates the idea that unreasonable behaviour
by regulators generates resistance to compliance. Unreasonableness may involve disrespect
for citizens, or arbitrary refusal to take their concerns into account in the enforcement
process. Citizen response is likely to be weakened respect for compliance with the law. In the
context of taxation, non-compliance could be interpreted as taxpayers expressive rebellion
against Tax Office enforcement actions, or laws that are perceived to be illegitimate. Smith
and Kinsey (1987) have also argued that peoples social networks and associations help
shape their perceptions, norms and attitudes, which then influence their responses to
imagined and actual sanctions. Recent research has highlighted the importance of using these
socio-psychological factors to explain taxpayers non-compliance, with some authors
showing taxpayers perceptions about evasion and fairness having a direct influence. For
example, Porcano (1988) discussed how individuals who perceive evasion as prevalent,
and/or to be an insignificant crime, tend to be less compliant. Taken together, the results of
these studies suggest that taxpayers attitudes towards the Tax Office and the tax system in
general need to be taken into account when attempting to explain non-compliance.
                                                
1 The basic idea of Kagan and Scholzs (1984) model is that when amoral calculators fail to comply, it is
because they calculate that the costs of compliance exceed the benefits, but for political citizens non-
compliance arises because they are not persuaded that compliance is a just obligation of citizenship.
3The role of tax practitioners in taxpayer compliance
The effect that tax practitioners have on taxpayer compliance has also received substantial
attention in recent years (for example, Ayres, Jackson & Hite, 1989; Jackson, Milliron &
Toy, 1988; Klepper & Nagin, 1989a, 1989b; Reckers, Sanders & Wyndelts, 1991). Until
recently, tax compliance research did not consider the potential impact of the tax agents on
the compliance decision.
While tax practitioners alleviate many of the informational and computational barriers to tax
compliance, they also possess the expertise to assist their clients in exploiting opportunities
for tax non-compliance. In fact, Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1991) suggest that tax agents
have a dual role. Given that they have unique knowledge of tax law, tax agents can be both
exploiters and enforcers of the law. Klepper et al. suggest that in unambiguous situations
tax agents tend to be enforcers of the law. In these situations, they tend to ensure compliance
by recommending cautious tax minimisation strategies. In contrast, when a tax agent is faced
with an ambiguous situation, they tend to be exploiters of the law, in that they encourage tax
avoidance.
Given that tax agents do have the knowledge and expertise to exploit the grey areas of tax
law, a number of studies have examined whether professionally prepared returns are more
non-compliant in nature than self-prepared returns. Findings from these studies have in fact
suggested that professionally prepared returns are more non-compliant. For example, Smith
and Kinsey (1987) found that audited tax returns prepared by Certified Public Accountants2
and attorneys tended to have much higher dollar audit adjustments. Erard (1993) also found
that paid-preparer returns exhibited greater non-compliance. Similar findings have been
reported in many other studies (for example, Ayres, Jackson & Hite, 1989; Kaplan, Reckers,
West & Boyd, 1988; McGill, 1988). Klepper and Nagin (1989a) reported that in the United
States in 1979 about 44% of all tax returns were prepared by tax practitioners, yet these
returns accounted for 74% of all non-compliance. Given the fact that 70% of Australians now
choose to use a tax practitioners to prepare their tax return, the potential loss of tax revenue
                                                
2 Also known as Certified Practising Accountants.
4due to non-compliant reporting poses a serious problem for the Australian Taxation Office
(Tax Office). The question of who instigates this non-compliant reporting  the tax agent or
taxpayer  is therefore an important question and is discussed in the next section.
Aggressive tax reporting
In the Tax Office 19992000 annual report, the Commissioner of Taxation highlighted the
importance of continuing to pursue the issue of aggressive tax planning. Despite the
strategies that have been put in place to combat the rise of aggressive tax planning, the Tax
Office is continuing to see intense activity among those who devise, promote, market and
participate in such activities. In this paper, the term aggressive tax reporting refers to the
situation where there is a reasonable probability that a particular tax return stance will not be
upheld by an audit and subsequent legal challenge. Thus an aggressive position is a risky
choice due to the uncertainty of its final disposition (Hite & McGill, 1992, p. 400).
While many in the aggressive tax planning industry argue that they are simply responding to
the demands of their clients, there have been many situations where participants in aggressive
tax planning schemes have been led to invest based on trust in the proposals marketed to
them (Commissioner of Taxation, 2000). Thus the question of who instigates aggressive tax
reporting  whether it is driven by demand or supply  is complex, albeit interesting and
important. Studies exploring this question have yielded contradictory results.
Results from a number of surveys (Collins, Milliron & Toy, 1990; Hite & McGill, 1992;
Sakurai & Braithwaite, 2001; Tan, 1999) indicate that the majority of taxpayers want their
tax agent to assume an honest role and prepare an accurate return. Collins et al. (1990)
concluded that approximately 70% of their sample used tax agents to file an accurate return,
with only 25% indicating that minimising their tax liability was their primary objective. Hite
and McGill (1992) and Tan (1999) found that taxpayers tend to agree with conservative
advice offered by their tax agent, and to disagree with aggressive advice. Sakurai and
Braithwaite (2001) also reported that taxpayers generally want an honest tax agent who files
an accurate return.
5In contrast, studies performed on tax agents themselves indicate that they view their clients as
the initiators of aggressive tax reporting (Attwell & Sawyer, 2001; Klepper & Nagin, 1989a;
Schisler, 1994; Tooley, 1992). This point of view is also supported by Sakurai and
Braithwaites (2001) research on a sample of 2040 Australian taxpayers. Sakurai and
Braithwaite identified three types of tax adviser sought by taxpayers. The most popular type
sought was one who was honest and risk-averse. The second most popular type was one who
engaged in cautious minimisation of tax. These practitioners avoid conflict, yet are
sophisticated about identifying opportunities to minimise tax. The third type of tax
practitioner sought by taxpayers was the creative accountant, aggressive tax planning type.
Here, the taxpayer wants a practitioner who is well networked and knows what issues the Tax
Office is targeting at that time. Unlike the second type of practitioner, the creative accountant
is not threatened by conflict. According to Sakurai and Braithwaite, this is by far the least
popular preference among ordinary taxpayers, but identifies a niche market that is significant
and of great concern to tax authorities.
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) also showed that taxpayers are likely to find tax practitioners
who have the attributes they value most highly. This finding suggests that a small number of
taxpayers do in fact look for, and ultimately find, an aggressive tax agent who will
aggressively minimise the tax they are required to pay. The present study aimed to further
examine this group of taxpayers in an attempt to identify which factors are important for
predicting when a taxpayer will seek such advice.
The present study
The study reported here used data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey
(Braithwaite, 2000) to study those taxpayers who have expressed a preference for a creative
accountant of the aggressive tax planning type and who actually have an aggressive tax
agent. In other words, this group has found a tax agent who corresponds with their ideal. It is
assumed that these taxpayers will pose a greater threat to the Tax Office than taxpayers who
prefer to use an honest and risk-averse practitioner.
The study attempts to understand how high-risk taxpayers and high-risk practitioners form
their partnerships by examining aggressive taxpayers attitudes and perceptions of the
Australian tax system. Specifically, it asks if the views of aggressive taxpayers differ from
6those of others in the general population. Following the argument of Braithwaite
(forthcoming)  taxpayers who distance themselves from the Tax Office tend to develop
critical attitudes towards the Tax Office to justify their behaviour  it is hypothesised here
that taxpayers who have an aggressive tax practitioner will be more critical of the Tax Office
and of the tax system in general. By providing a psychological profile of this sub-sample of
taxpayers, policy-makers will be able to develop more appropriate policies for dealing with
taxpayers in this high-risk group.
Method
Using data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (Braithwaite, 2000), this
study examined some of the psychological factors which differentiate taxpayers who have an
aggressive tax agent from those who do not.
The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey was mailed to 7754 Australians between
June and October 2000. Participants were randomly selected from publicly available electoral
rolls. The sample therefore included both taxpayers and non-taxpayers. Completed
questionnaires were received from 2040 respondents, yielding a response rate of 29%. While
29% is low, such a response rate is not unusual in the tax context, with some arguing (for
example, Wallschutzky, 1984) that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected
to yield higher than a 30 to 40% response rate. More importantly, however, the respondents
to this survey were a representative sample of the general population (for details see Mearns
& Braithwaite, 2001).
For the purposes of this study, two groups of taxpayers were of interest. The first was a group
of taxpayers who reported that they preferred a creative accountant and who actually had an
aggressive tax agent (n = 539). The second group of interest was taxpayers who did not
prefer a creative accountant and did not have an aggressive tax agent (n = 861). See
Appendix for details on how each of these two groups/variables were constructed.
7Analyses and results
The data consisted of taxpayers responses to a variety of variables designed to measure
beliefs and attitudes towards the Tax Office and the Australian tax system. The group that
want and have an aggressive tax agent was compared to the general taxpayer population in
terms of the following constructs: their demographic profile, their world views; their
motivational postures; their evaluation of the Tax Office and tax system; and their individual
experiences (see Braithwaite, 2001, for a detailed description of these constructs). It should
be noted here that only the variables that appeared to highlight important differences between
the two groups of taxpayers were examined. Following an examination of the variables that
showed differences between these two groups of taxpayers, a discriminant function analysis
was used to identify the variables that had most predictive power in differentiating the two
groups.
Demographics
A number of demographic variables have been shown to play a role in tax non-compliance
(for a discussion see Jackson & Milliron, 1986). Based on the data collected in the
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey, taxpayers who reported that they want and
have an aggressive tax agent were differentiated from taxpayers who do not have an
aggressive tax agent on three demographic variables: age, education and family income (see
Table 1). There were no other demographic differences between taxpayers who want and
have an aggressive tax agent and other taxpayers.
Table 1: A comparison of demographic variables for taxpayers who want and have an
aggressive tax agent (aggressive) and other taxpayers (others) (standard deviations are
given in brackets)
Variable Aggressive Others t value
Age 46.37 (14.24) 48.33 (14.07) 2.51**
Education 2.82 (1.61) 3.05 (1.69) 2.55**
Family income (000s) 55.16 (43.94) 49.96 (32.47) 2.27*
*p<0.05  **p<0.01
8Findings show that taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent tend to be slightly
younger on average, tend to be less educated, and tend to have a family income significantly
higher than those who do not have an aggressive tax agent.
World views
World views are a persons underlying beliefs about the world they live in and want to live
in. The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey operationalised this construct by
measuring taxpayers social and personal values in general, their values towards paying tax,
and their priorities for tax reform. Table 2 compares the mean scores of taxpayers who want
and have an aggressive tax agent with other taxpayers in terms of a number of world views.
Table 2: A comparison of taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent
(aggressive) and other taxpayers (others) on a number of variables designed to measure
a person’s world views (standard deviations are given in brackets)
Variable Aggressive Others t value
Social and personal values
    Status 4.69 (0.95) 4.34 (1.02) 6.42***
    Propriety 5.65 (0.86) 5.54 (0.90) 2.27*
    Effectiveness 5.58 (0.81) 5.44 (0.83) 2.99**
Tax morality
    Honesty in taxpaying 3.39 (0.70) 3.69 (0.69) 7.82***
    Tax evasion admiration 2.83 (0.88) 2.51 (0.85) 6.69***
Priorities for tax reform
    Making the rich pay 3.96 (0.84) 4.00 (0.87)   ns
    Cutting tax and administration 3.90 (0.76) 3.71 (0.85) 4.25***
    Simplifying the tax system 3.10 (0.95) 2.89 (0.94) 4.08***
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001
Social and personal values. As can be seen in Table 2, those taxpayers who want and have an
aggressive tax agent score significantly higher on the status variable than other taxpayers.
The status variable measured the importance people placed on economic prosperity, power
9and having high standing in their community. The results show that those involved in
aggressive tax planning are more status-oriented in that they are more likely to view these
attributes as important.
Propriety was designed to measure whether people thought it was important to do the right
thing and follow the rules of correct conduct. Contrary to expectation, those involved in
aggressive tax planning were more likely to view this attribute as more important than the
general taxpayer. This is a particularly interesting finding as it suggests that taxpayers who
are involved in aggressive tax planning do not believe that what they are doing is wrong.
Additional results (see below) in fact suggest that they think minimising tax is the smart thing
to do.
Effectiveness measured participants resourcefulness and efficiency in using the best methods
to get the best results. Results from the survey showed that those involved in aggressive tax
planning thought this value was more important.
Tax morality. A number of variables were used in the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions
Survey in an attempt to gauge the level of tax morality held by a taxpayer. Michael Wenzel
of the Centre for Tax System Integrity developed a scale labelled a personal ethical norm of
honesty in taxpaying to measure whether taxpayers believed they should honestly declare all
cash earnings and not overstate deductions on their tax returns. Results showed that taxpayers
who want and have an aggressive tax agent are less likely to think one should honestly
declare cash earnings, are more likely to think working for cash without paying tax is a trivial
offence, and are more likely to think it acceptable to overstate tax deductions.
Friedrich Schneider3 designed a multi-item scale labelled admiration of cash economy tax
evasion. Again, this scale was designed to measure a taxpayers overall level of morality
towards paying tax. Specifically, this variable measured how a taxpayer would respond if
they found out an acquaintance was working for cash payments without paying tax (that is,
whether they would care, whether they thought it was wrong, and whether they thought the
                                                
3 Friedrich Schneider is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Tax System Integrity. He is a leading researcher on
issues associated with the cash economy internationally.
10
acquaintance was clever). Results showed that taxpayers who want and have an aggressive
tax agent are more likely to view this hypothetical acquaintance as smart for being involved
in the cash economy and less likely to judge the behaviour as immoral.
Priorities for tax reform. A number of scales were developed for the Community Hopes,
Fears and Actions Survey to measure taxpayers priorities for tax reform. Not surprisingly,
compared to the general taxpayer, those taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax
agent thought it more important that taxes be kept as low as possible and that the costs of
administering the tax system should be minimised. Further, compared to the general
taxpayer, they thought the tax system should be simplified. As can be seen in Table 2,
taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent do not differ from the general
population in believing that the rich should pay more in tax.
Motivational postures
Motivational postures represent the ways in which individuals position themselves in relation
to a regulatory authority, and are predispositions to compliant or non-compliant conduct
(Braithwaite, 1995). Using items adapted from previous work, Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns
& Graham (2001) showed that taxpayers adopt five different motivational postures in the
taxation context. The posture that received the strongest endorsement was commitment,
followed by capitulation, resistance, game-playing and disengagement. Table 3 compares the
mean scores of taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent with others on each of
these motivational postures.
Table 3: A comparison of motivational postures adopted by taxpayers who want and
have an aggressive tax agent (target) and other taxpayers (others) (standard deviations
are given in brackets)
Variable Aggressive Others t value
Commitment 3.76 (0.56) 3.91 (0.55)   5.19***
Capitulation 3.37 (0.53) 3.37 (0.54)   ns
Resistance 3.29 (0.51) 3.11 (0.55)  6.24***
Game-playing 2.41 (0.53) 2.26 (0.52)  5.37***
Disengagement 2.61 (0.58) 2.21 (0.57) 12.60***
***p<0.001
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As can be seen from Table 3, taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are less
committed to the tax system than the general taxpayer. If a taxpayer adopts a commitment
posture towards the tax system, it means they feel a sense of moral obligation to pay their
taxes and pay their taxes with good will because they believe paying tax ultimately
advantages everyone.
The posture of capitulation means that a taxpayer may not be happy with the Tax Office or
tax system, but they acknowledge it is a part of life and they must accept that taxes need to be
paid. Capitulation signals an intention to be cooperative with the Tax Office. The two groups
of taxpayers did not differ significantly on this motivational posture.
Findings also showed that taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are significantly
more resistant towards the tax system than the general taxpayer (see Table 3). Taxpayers who
adopt a resistance posture are likely to view the Tax Office with antagonism because they
feel the Tax Office pushes them around. Further, these taxpayers believe people should take a
stand against the Tax Office.
A particularly interesting motivational posture to examine is game-playing. Taxpayers who
adopt a game-playing posture enjoy the game of finding the grey areas of tax law and the
challenge of minimising tax. In fact, they believe the Tax Office respects them for being
creative in their tax affairs. As one might expect, findings from the survey showed that those
involved in aggressive tax planning scored significantly higher on this posture than taxpayers
in general. This result is hardly surprising, given that those involved in aggressive tax
planning seek to minimise their tax by exploiting loopholes in the tax law.
The fifth motivational posture measured in the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey
was that of disengagement. Taxpayers who are disengaged from the tax system are those who
do not care that they are not doing the right thing by the Tax Office and they believe the Tax
Office cannot do anything to them if they choose not to pay their taxes. Further, they do not
really want to know what the Tax Office expects from them. As can be seen in Table 3, those
taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent are more likely to be disengaged from
the tax system than others.
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Evaluation of the tax system
The results from a number of scales were analysed with the aim of gauging taxpayers
attitudes towards the tax system and the way in which the Tax Office operates. Table 4
presents the relevant variables which differentiated taxpayers who want and have an
aggressive tax agent from others. Of interest was whether those involved in aggressive tax
planning see themselves as receiving less favourable outcomes in relation to their tax affairs
than taxpayers in general.
Table 4: A comparison of taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent
(aggressive) and other taxpayers (others) on their evaluation of the Tax Office
(standard deviations are given in brackets)
Variable Aggressive Others t value
Distributive justice 3.52 (1.00) 3.73 (1.02) 3.63**
Citizens being treated as trustworthy 3.12 (0.79) 3.22 (0.81) 2.22*
Material loss 3.25 (0.84) 3.00 (0.89) 5.29***
Legitimacy 2.66 (0.64) 2.78 (0.70) 3.25**
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001
Distributive justice (Tyler, 1997) refers to the perceived fairness of outcomes. In the taxation
context, if a taxpayer were to view a decision made by the Tax Office as being unfair or
unjust, then the distributive justice principles would not have been met. The index of
distributive justice in the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey was designed to ask
taxpayers how often they agreed with decisions made by the Tax Office and how often the
decisions had been favourable to them.
Of central importance in theories of procedural justice are issues of respect for citizens.
The citizen trustworthiness scale was developed by John Braithwaite and Toni Makkai
(1994) and was designed to measure an aspect of procedural justice in the taxation context.
This two-item scale asked survey respondents whether they thought the Tax Office treated
taxpayers in a trustworthy manner.
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Trevor Suttons (1997) material loss index was also analysed. This index was designed to ask
taxpayers how they felt about paying tax and whether they believed paying tax removed the
incentive to earn more income.
A multi-item favourability scale, based on the work of Tyler (1997), proved useful in group
comparisons. This scale was designed to test the perceived legitimacy of the Tax Office.
According to Tyler (1997), having legitimacy influences the degree to which an authority is
or is not effective.
Table 4 presents data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey on each of these
four scales. With respect to the distributive justice scale, taxpayers involved in aggressive tax
planning are less likely to agree with Tax Office decisions than are other taxpayers. They are
also less likely to think the Tax Office treats citizens as trustworthy. Taxpayers who wanted
and had an aggressive tax agent are more likely to think they would be better off working less
given the rate of tax they have to pay (as measured by the material loss index) and less likely
to view the Tax Office as a legitimate institution. More specifically, they view the Tax Office
as being too powerful and too influenced by political pressures.4
Individual experiences
According to some deterrence theorists, a number of factors other than the likelihood of
getting caught need to be taken into account when investigating taxpayers non-compliance
(Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Braithwaite et al. (2001) pointed out that one needs to consider
peoples perceptions of the probability of getting caught, the perceived probability of
receiving particular punishments, and the psychological and social problems posed by being
caught. The psychological and social facets of how the individual interprets punishment were
measured in two ways. Respondents were first asked how big a problem it would be to them
if different types of punishment were received. As can be seen in Table 5, taxpayers involved
in aggressive tax planning are less likely to view receiving punishment as a problem.
                                                
4 These specific items in the scale accounted for most of the difference.
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Table 5: A comparison of taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent (aggressive)
and other taxpayers (others) on their individual experiences (standard deviations are given
in brackets)
Variable Aggressive Others t value
Problem of punishment 3.46 (0.73) 3.55 (0.66) 2.19*
Shame acknowledgment 2.94 (0.84) 3.13 (0.81) 4.04***
Shame displacement 2.01 (0.70) 1.75 (0.61) 6.99***
*p<0.05  ***p<0.001
Next, respondents were asked how they would react to a particular type of punishment (that
is, a fine). Of interest was the extent to which they anticipated feeling shame when they were
caught and punished for a tax offence. Braithwaite et al. (2001) hypothesised that if
regulatory action does not result in reactions of shame acknowledgment (for example, feeling
remorse, wanting to put things right), compliance is unlikely as an outcome. Findings
revealed that taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are less likely to have reactions of
shame acknowledgment. In other words, they appear not to feel remorse for evading their tax
obligations. A reaction that is also known to undermine compliance is shame displacement.
Shame displacement means that an individual does not accept responsibility for wrongdoing
and they blame others for what has happened to them. This variable was measured in the
survey by asking respondents whether they blame the Tax Office and feel unfairly treated by
the Tax Office. Results showed that taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent are
more likely than others to blame the Tax Office and think their treatment is unfair. As a result
of this, they are more likely to want to get even with the Tax Office. This could manifest
itself in non-compliant behaviour.
Summary of findings
The study reported in this paper examined whether taxpayers involved in aggressive tax
planning are different demographically, hold different world views, adopt different
motivational postures, evaluate the Tax Office differently, or have different individual
experiences than taxpayers not involved in aggressive tax planning. To summarise, it appears
that taxpayers who seek and have an aggressive tax agent are slightly younger, earn more and
are less educated than the general taxpayer. They are also more status-oriented, place value
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on behaving with propriety more generally, and believe they are more resourceful and
efficient in using the best method to get the best results. The overall level of morality towards
paying tax is also much lower in taxpayers who have an aggressive tax agent. They appear to
be more against the idea of paying tax and are less likely to think that nothing is wrong with
evading tax. In fact, this group of taxpayers appears to think evading tax is the smart thing to
do.
Taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are less committed to the tax system, are more
resistant in their dealings with the Tax Office, and are more likely to feel disengaged from
tax authorities. Not surprisingly, these taxpayers are more likely to adopt a game-playing
posture, whereby they enjoy seeking out the grey areas of tax law.
Taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent place less value on the tax system and
Tax Office. Compared to taxpayers in general, they believe the tax system should be
simplified and the costs of administering it should be minimised. They are less likely to view
the Tax Office as a legitimate institution and are more likely to disagree with Tax Office
decisions.
The findings suggest that deterrence is limited in its effect with this group of taxpayers.
Taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent are more likely to blame the Tax
Office and feel unfairly treated under circumstances where they are caught and punished for a
tax offence. Most importantly, taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are less likely to
view punishment as a problem and are less likely to feel ashamed or responsible if caught and
punished for a tax offence.
Discriminant function analysis
In the previous section, 20 variables were found to discriminate taxpayers who want and have
an aggressive tax agent from those who do not.5 Stepwise discriminant function analysis was
used to determine which variables were the most important in predicting whether a taxpayer
would want and use an aggressive tax agent. Variables were entered and retained in the
discriminant function if they were significant at the 0.05 level or less. Table 6 contains the
                                                
5 Twenty-one variables discriminated between the two groups if the age variable was considered.
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standardised coefficients, with only the significant values presented. Those with the largest
absolute values made the largest contribution to the function, and discussion will be limited
to these variables.
As can be seen in Table 6, six variables made significant contributions to the discriminant
function. The six selected variables were effective in discriminating groups, leading to a
significant multivariate Wilks Lambda, χ2(6) = 0.86, p<0.001. Of the six significant
variables, the game-playing posture contributed the most, followed by honesty in taxpaying,
family income, shame displacement, status and resistance.6
Honesty in taxpaying was negatively related to the dependent variable, confirming that
taxpayers who have an aggressive tax agent tend to have a lower level of honesty towards
paying tax. The positive relationships between game-playing, resistance, family income,
shame displacement and status and the dependent variable indicate that taxpayers who have
an aggressive tax agent tend to have higher family incomes, enjoy seeking out the grey areas
of tax law, are more likely to be resisters in their motivational posture towards the tax
system, are more status-oriented and are less likely to accept responsibility by blaming the
Tax Office if they are caught and punished for a tax offence. Forty-five per cent of taxpayers
who have an aggressive tax agent were correctly classified by the function. Of taxpayers who
do not have an aggressive tax agent, 84% were accurately classified by the function. The
overall correct classification rate was 69%.
                                                
6 The leave-one-out method was used for cross-validating the data. The same six variables were found to
contribute to the discriminant function.
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Table 6: Standardised coefficients for a stepwise discriminant function analysis for
discriminating between taxpayers who have an aggressive tax agent and those who do
not
Independent variable Dependent variable
Type of agent (aggr. versus not aggr.)
Standardised function coefficient a
V1 Education 
V2 Family income 0.258
V3 Status 0.184
V4 Propriety 
V5 Effectiveness 
V6 Honesty in taxpaying 0.357
V7 Tax evasion admiration 
V8 Cutting tax and administration 
V9 Simplifying the tax system 
V10 Commitment 
V11 Resistance 0.181
V12 Game-playing 0.673
V13 Disengagement 
V14 Distributive justice 
V15 Citizens being treated as trustworthy 
V16 Material loss 
V17 Legitimacy 
V18 Problem with punishment 
V19 Shame acknowledgment 
V20 Shame displacement 0.186
Canonical correlation 0.381
Wilks Lambda 0.855
Chi-square 173.688
Significance level 0.000
a Insignificant variables marked with .
Discussion and implications
In previous studies, the debate over whether tax agents encourage taxpayers to take more
risks by exploiting the grey areas of tax law, or whether taxpayers demand that tax agents
explore these areas, is far from resolved. Findings have been reported to support both sides of
the argument. While not directly addressing this question, the present study attempted to
profile a group of Australian taxpayers who said they wanted and used an aggressive tax
agent.
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The results of the discriminant function analysis indicated that of the 20 variables that
differentiated taxpayers at the bi-variate level, only six were important in a large multivariate
analysis. The procedure of identifying these six important variables provides the Tax Office,
and tax practitioners, with useful information for developing strategic policies aimed at
reducing aggressive tax planning.
Taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning tend to have higher family incomes and tend
to be more status-oriented than general taxpayers. Given the importance that taxpayers
involved in aggressive tax planning place on their standing in the community, it is not
surprising that they may attempt to reduce their tax aggressively in order to have more
disposable income. Given that taxpayers who earn more have more to gain by evading their
taxes, it is hardly a surprise that interventions geared towards taxpayers at the upper end of
the income scale are likely to be more effective in reducing aggressive tax planning.
How should we interpret the finding that taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are
more likely to blame the Tax Office if asked to pay substantial fines or penalties for tax
offences? They are also more likely to anticipate wanting to get even with the Tax Office if
given such punishment. This is a particularly interesting result, as it has implications for the
way the Tax Office deals with non-compliance within this group of taxpayers.
As noted earlier, motivational postures represent the ways individuals position themselves in
relation to a regulatory authority, reflect the desire to cooperate or not, and are
predispositions to compliant or non-compliant conduct (Braithwaite, 1995). The findings of
the discriminant function analysis revealed that taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning
are more likely to adopt a resistant posture towards the Tax Office. They are more likely to
view the Tax Office as pushing them around and, as a result, are more likely to believe that
people should take a stand against the Tax Office. This finding, taken together with the
results presented in the previous paragraph, suggests that bullying or issuing indiscriminate
threats to those suspected of non-compliance may be ineffective, and may in fact lead to
higher levels of non-compliance. This finding fits Brehm & Brehms (1981) research into
reactance, which has shown that the use of threat and coercion, particularly when perceived
as illegitimate, can produce the opposite behaviour from that advocated. That does not mean,
of course, that strict enforcement and legal sanctions are unnecessary or inappropriate.
Punishment and deterrence of unjustifiable violations are essential even under a cooperative
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enforcement strategy. Perhaps a more appropriate strategy would call for discriminating as
opposed to legalistic rule enforcement (see Kagan & Scholz, 1984). This could be achieved
by focusing on taxpayers (and their advisers) who are engaging purposefully in unusual
manoeuvres. Twenty-five years ago, Grbich (1976, p. 238) forcefully made the point that tax
authorities should be concentrating on taxpayers who are purposefully involved in artificial
tax avoidance devices. Taxpayers with a legitimate excuse or with a mistaken interpretation
of the law might view responsiveness from the Tax Office in a positive manner and, as a
result, the gesture may act to bring this otherwise honest group of taxpayer back into the
system voluntarily.
The game-playing posture was also found to discriminate between taxpayers who were
involved in aggressive tax planning and those who were not. This variable was in fact the
most important, with the aggressive tax planning group significantly more likely to report
using the grey areas of tax law and enjoying the challenge of minimising tax. Taxpayers
moral obligation towards paying tax was also found to differ between the two groups.
Taxpayers with an aggressive tax agent are more likely to think it is acceptable to overstate
tax deductions and not report cash income, suggesting that they do not view such behaviour
as immoral. Together, these findings support the argument that taxpayers may be the
instigators of aggressive tax reporting. Caution is needed, however, in generalising this
conclusion to all taxpayers involved in tax minimisation.
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) discussed how taxpayers open to low-risk tax minimisation
strategies often find themselves with tax agents who serve taxpayers open to high-risk
minimisation strategies. Tax agents are usually expected to correctly interpret the level of risk
their clients are willing to take and are also expected to judge what is acceptable
minimisation behaviour. Often, however, this does not occur. Tax agents tend to be more
adventurous than their clients in thinking a particular minimisation strategy will be upheld by
a subsequent legal challenge (Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992); so what is high risk for a
taxpayer may be considered low risk to the agent.
Two possible solutions for dealing with these potential communication problems are
apparent. First, eternal vigilance is obviously needed against the opening of tax loopholes.
The integrity of overarching principles that aim to bring about compliance with the spirit of
the law, as opposed to the letter of the law, needs to be defended (see McBarnet, 2001).
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However, as discussed by McBarnet (p. 10), it is no easy matter to sustain overarching
principles and prevent them from being converted or reduced to rules that can then be used
once again as material to creatively avoid tax. John Braithwaite is working on this challenge
as a current project of the Centre for Tax System Integrity.
Another approach for dealing with the issue of aggressive tax planning (or high-risk
minimisation strategies) would be to develop formal guidelines and accreditation or
registration procedures for the professional conduct of tax advisers and practitioners.
Surprisingly, guidelines such as these have not yet been developed and only recently has the
general area of professional ethics and responsibility received attention (for reviews see
Cranston, 1995; Preston, 1996; Ross, 1998).
Woellner, Barkoczy, Murphy & Evans (2001, pp. 17711773) have recently put forth a
proposal for the formulation of general guidelines for the ethical obligations of tax advisers in
Australia. Their suggestion is to divide the tax advisers role and ethical responsibilities into
four areas: tax planning advice; preparation of tax returns and dealing with the Tax Office;
the adviser as advocate; and the advisers obligation to society. Some of the specific ideas
put forth in their proposed guidelines include: ensuring that advisers not recommend a course
of action merely because the reality is that the client will probably get away with it; making
sure that advisers have an obligation to their clients and community to ensure that a proposed
scheme not be a paper arrangement only, but have commercial and family reality; and,
where a client intends to file a false return or statement, the adviser should attempt to
dissuade them from doing so. It is proposed that if the client insists on proceeding, the
adviser should cease to act for the client in that matter. Of course, guidelines are not enough.
Moses did not come down from the mountain with the ten guidelines; he also led the
development of accreditation, education, confession (shame acknowledgment as an
alternative to shame displacement) and excommunication processes of the church. Tax
integrity still awaits its Moses.
The development of guidelines such as those suggested by Woellner et al. would be a start in
providing a safeguard for tax practitioners who feel pressured into developing clever
strategies for minimising their clients tax obligations, as well as protecting taxpayers from
tax agents who (1) may misinterpret their clients wishes or (2) lack the ability or integrity to
prepare accurate and correct tax returns.
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Conclusion
While there is no clear and easy solution to the problem of aggressive tax planning, this paper
has attempted to provide the reader with a broader understanding of how taxpayers involved
in aggressive tax planning think and operate in the tax system. The results are consistent with
a number of the theories of non-compliance discussed in the introduction, including
deterrence, reactance, procedural justice and shame management theory. The results suggest
that the motivational drivers of aggressive tax planning may be multiple, with a number of
interconnected theories each contributing a little to the explanatory power. The results have
demonstrated that taxpayers who say they prefer high-risk advice, and who have actually
sought out an aggressive tax agent, differ substantially from other taxpayers. Their tendency
towards engaging in aggressive tax planning was seen as a reaction towards an organisation
they perceived to be illegitimate.
While the findings of this study appear to support the notion that taxpayers with an interest in
high-risk tax minimisation strategies instigate aggressive tax reporting, further work needs to
be done on a sample of taxpayers who are actually known to be involved in high-risk tax-
effective schemes to see how these taxpayers come to be involved in such activities. In
addition, much remains to be done in the area of the relationship between taxpayers and their
tax agents; specifically, a question of interest would be to identify how tax agents and their
clients broach the idea of aggressive tax reporting. In order to more fully understand the
intricacies of this interesting group of taxpayers, these and related strategies will be the topic
of future research conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity.
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APPENDIX
Two groups of taxpayer were of interest for the present paper.
• taxpayers who reported that they preferred a creative accountant and who actually had
an aggressive tax agent (target group), and
• taxpayers who did not prefer a creative accountant and did not have an aggressive tax
agent.
How survey participants responded to various questions in the Community Hopes, Fears and
Actions Survey determined to which group they belonged. This appendix describes the
procedure used to determine inclusion in these two groups.
Scale construction
Survey participants were asked the following two sets of questions (see Braithwaite, 2001,
for a full description of the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey).
1. If you do generally use a tax agent or advisor to prepare your income tax return, how well
do the following statements describe his/her approach to taxation matters?
Strongly
disagree Disagree Neither Agree
Strongly
agree
1. I have a tax agent who is clever in the way she/he
arranges my affairs to minimize tax ............................. 1 2 3 4 5
2. My tax agent helps me interpret ambiguous or
grey areas of the tax law in my favour ......................... 1 2 3 4 5
3. My tax agent has suggested complicated schemes
I could get into to avoid tax.......................................... 1 2 3 4 5
An aggressive tax planning scale (Scale 1) was constructed by combining responses to the
three parts of Question 1. This particular scale determined if the taxpayer actually had an
aggressive tax agent.
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2. What priority would you place on the following qualities if you were to choose a tax agent
or advisor?
Priority
1. Someone who knows their way around the system to minimize the
tax I have to pay ...............................................................................................
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Top
(4)
2. Someone who will take advantage of grey areas of the law on my
behalf................................................................................................................
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Top
(4)
3. Someone who is well networked and knows what the Tax Office is
checking on at any particular time....................................................................
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Top
(4)
4. A creative accountant ...................................................................................
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Top
(4)
5. Someone who can deliver on aggressive tax planning .................................
Low
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(3)
Top
(4)
In order to determine if a taxpayer wanted to have a creative accountant, two additional
scales were constructed using parts of Question 2. The first scale (Scale 2) assessed the
priority taxpayers would place on having a tax agent who has a cautious minimising and
conflict avoidance style. This scale was measured by combining responses to parts 1 and 2 of
Question 2. The second scale (Scale 3) assessed the priority taxpayers would place on having
a creative accountant with an aggressive tax planning style. This scale was measured by
combining responses to parts 3, 4 and 5 of Question 2.
Conditions for group inclusion
Taxpayers who want and have an aggressive tax agent. If a taxpayer scored greater than 2.5
on Scale 2 or scored greater than 2 on Scale 3, and also scored greater than 2.7 on Scale 1,
they were classified as a taxpayer who reported that they preferred a creative accountant and
who actually had an aggressive tax agent (target group). A total of 539 taxpayers were
classified into this group.
Taxpayers who did not want and did not have an aggressive tax agent. If a taxpayer scored
less than 2.5 on Scale 2 and scored less than 2 on Scale 3, or scored less than 2.7 on Scale 1,
they were classified as a taxpayer who did not prefer a creative accountant and did not have
an aggressive tax agent. A total of 861 taxpayers were classified into this group.
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